This piece is adapted from Ed Gresser’s PPI report: End of an Error: The Future of Trade Policy After the Midterms.
In the Biblical Book of Daniel, the mysterious writing on the wall conveys an ominous message to Babylon’s unlucky King Belshazzar:
“God has numbered the days of your kingdom and brought it to an end; you have been weighed in the balance and found wanting; your kingdom is divided and given to [others].”
The public’s message to Mr. Trump in this week’s election was just about as blunt — especially with respect to the trade wars he made his signature economic policy. Two years into the country’s first general tariff increase since Herbert Hoover, family budgets are stressed, workers’ real wages are down, farm and factory competitiveness have eroded, and America’s worldwide power and reputation are diminished. The “reindustrialization” and “new golden age” he promised as compensation are nowhere in sight. Having weighed his policies and found them wanting, voters have given much of his power to others (namely, Hakeem Jeffries and Chuck Schumer).
The new Congress taking office in January can respond to the voters’ central hope — a more affordable life for families, lower costs for farmers and manufacturers — by ending his tariff experiment and laying the foundation for something better under the next president.
Closing down the tariff experiment would be relatively easy, at least in principle. Mr. Trump and his team imposed it through a mix of anti-Constitutional decrees at home and economic coercion abroad, rather than through legitimate and durable law. That means their tariff wall is legally flimsy and their arrangements with foreign governments are ephemeral. The incoming Congress can push to scrap it without regret. Doing so would help remove some inflationary pressure on the U.S. economy and begin rebuilding relationships with America’s neighbors and allies. Should Trump retain enough rump Republican support to sustain a veto, the next president can vaporize his tariff regime with the stroke of a pen on day one.
The more difficult challenge is to find the right replacement. That is a longer-term project, entailing intellectual debate and consensus-building at home, skeptical reassessment of the past decade’s experiments in leftish “post-neoliberalism” and far-right “national conservatism,” and consultation with America’s friends abroad. But the new Congress can begin laying a foundation for the next president. Its three goals should be to:
Repair the Constitutional damage Trump’s decrees have caused, and restore the separation of powers;
Ease the cost of living for families and cancel the “cost premium” on American industry and agriculture;
Design an aspirational policy aimed at creating a better future, not reviving an idealized past.
The Legacy
On taking office in January 2025, Mr. Trump made two fateful choices. The first was to abandon his campaign promise to “defeat inflation and quickly bring down all prices” and raise tariff rates instead. The second was to bypass Congress, which under the Constitution has authority over tariffs and taxation, and rule by fiat rather than seeking a new tariff law. Since then, his administration has produced a stream of over 50 executive orders, proclamations, Federal Register notices, and other decrees meant to overwrite and replace the actual, congressionally authorized Harmonized Tariff Schedule.
Most notoriously, Trump imposed a sweeping set of global tariffs using the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, a Carter-era statute never previously used to enact import taxes. The Supreme Court struck them down a year later, but the administration has mostly reconstituted them using a different law — Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, which was not intended to give presidents a way to nullify Congress’ tariff authority, but rather to provide U.S. trade officials some power to use duties as negotiating leverage to reduce foreign barriers to American exports. The administration’s justifications for invoking this statute are comically thin and simultaneously offensive: It now officially claims, for instance, that it is slapping tariffs on Australian wine, European medicine, Japanese TV sets, and Canadian Zamboni machines because these countries are in some way soft on policing goods made with forced labor. (A final, smaller piece of the global tariff regime consists of “Section 338” duties on another 10% of imports from Canada, which stands accused of “discriminating” against American products.)
Secondarily, Trump has used “Section 232” of the trade code to implement tariffs on imports allegedly hurting U.S. national security. These cover about one-third of goods from abroad, including autos and automotive parts, commodities like wood, steel, and aluminum, and thousands of manufactured products made of metal such as coffins and coat hangers. As an index of this program’s impact, Commerce Department reports show the cost of steel in the U.S. rose from an average of $758 per ton in January 2025 to $1,208 per ton in midsummer 2026 — nearly three times the world average, and a massive burden on American factories making everything from cars to washing machines and tin cans.
A third group of tariffs, imposed in 2018 during the first Trump administration, covers about half of U.S. imports from China.
For two years, new tariff decrees have appeared on average every two weeks, to introduce new tariffs, replace old ones struck down in court, amplify or scale back earlier tariffs, or threaten particular foreign countries. Critics, from center-right economists to AFL-CIO officials, very reasonably describe this jury-rigged approach as “chaotic.” But the chaos is a surface issue, not a core problem. Though some important decrees face court challenges, the administration has still managed to bootstrap a new, extra-legal tariff system close to the 2024 Trump campaign’s concept of a 10% worldwide tariff and a 60% tariff rate on Chinese goods.
This new system has hit consumers and families hard: Staff economists at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York conclude that tariffs had added 2.9 percentage points to goods price inflation by February of this year. The Yale Budget Lab calculates that the tariffs currently cost American families $1,077 each, with the relative burden highest for low-income households.
But while most attention has gone to consumer costs, the tariff hikes have hit American industry even harder. Most U.S. imports, after all, are business inputs rather than consumer products. Construction firms, farmers, and manufacturers — companies in the very sectors Trump promised to revive — buy physical goods, or “inputs,” from all over the world. That means tariff hikes quickly and sharply raise their expenses. By comparison, tariffs fall lightly on services- and investment-centered industries such as securities trading, law, telecommunications, and real estate.
You’d expect something like this to push the U.S. economy away from goods production and toward services, and that’s what seems to be happening. Since 2024, farm incomes are down 5%, and farm bankruptcies have nearly doubled. Manufacturing now employs 20,000 fewer workers than it did in 2024 and has contracted relative to other industries, with the GDP share down from 9.8% to 9.5%.
The collapse of Del Monte’s Modesto peach cannery this summer vividly illustrates how these macro statistics look to farmers, workers, and communities. The cannery, tracing its history to 1906, was the main buyer of California’s Central Valley peaches and pears until this year. With American consumers incrementally shifting away from canned fruit in favor of fresh, it was growing less profitable. The Trump administration’s decisions to impose 50% tariffs on steel and tin cans dealt a final blow: When Del Monte declared bankruptcy, the company was unable to find a buyer for the cannery and chose to close it, eliminating 600 jobs. With the closure, $500 million worth of peach and pear contracts vaporized; farmers spent the summer ripping 420,000 peach trees out of the ground in a scramble to find new cash crops or sell off their land.
Trump’s trade policies were unpopular at the start — polling typically found about 40% of Americans in support and 55% to 60% opposed early in 2025 — and have steadily bled support since. By late summer 2026, opposition often reached 70%, as groups initially open to the administration’s experiments — self-identified Republicans, rural families, Americans without college degrees — soured on them. Whether in heavy manufacturing states such as Michigan and Ohio or agricultural centers like Kansas, candidates spent the midterms running against tariffs. All this culminated in November’s sweeping electoral rebuke.
As the January 3rd opening of the new Congress approaches, Americans rightly associate the tariff increases with higher prices, higher business costs, and damage to industry. They see no sign of any offsetting industrial boom; rather, farming is in crisis and manufacturing sagging. The new Congress needs no one so learned as the Biblical Daniel to interpret voters’ message in this recent election: “Stop it.”
Restore the Constitution
Lawmakers’ first task, and really the most important one, is to repair the damage Mr. Trump’s tariff program has done to the Constitution, and restore the appropriate separation of powers by reclaiming Congress’ power over tariff rates.
Mr. Trump at times refers to 19th- and early 20th-century protectionists such as William McKinley, Warren Harding, and Herbert Hoover as policy role models. But he is not their legitimate heir. Whatever one thinks of their economic ideas, the pro-tariff Republicans of yore fully respected the Constitution’s assignment of the taxation power to Congress. When they wanted higher tariffs, they asked Capitol Hill to pass a protectionist tariff law and accepted the result.
Trump, in contrast, has done something alien to American tradition by attempting to rule through decree, exhuming old laws passed long ago for wholly different purposes. IEEPA was meant for genuine emergencies like the outbreaks of wars and pandemics; “Section 301” was meant as a bargaining tool to bring foreign trade barriers down, not push U.S. tariffs up.
That is not how Mr. Trump has used them. He has not only imposed $100 billion tax increases on Americans by decree, but threatened to use tariffs to punish Canada for wildfire smoke drifting south and to interfere in Brazilian judicial proceedings, claimed that condensed milk is made of metal and coffins and horseshoes are “national security” products, and taken foreign gifts of gold clocks in exchange for lower tariffs. Without systemic change, his precedents will continue to warp policy even in wholly ethical administrations: Every interest group seeking special favors will know a friendly president can make Congress a backwater; and every future president will be aware that, facing Congressional opposition, he or she can revert to rule by decree.
Internationally, for the same reason, foreign countries will steer away from mutually beneficial trade deals with the United States. Trump’s constant threats against Canada and Mexico, and the real-world imposition of tariffs on their cars and metal, tell foreign governments that American presidents can breach and devalue congressionally approved agreements whenever they please.
Sometimes the solution to a big problem is complex, painful, and requires sacrifice. But sometimes the solution is simple, painless, and requires no sacrifice at all. The tariff decree problem is one of those. Congress has all the power it needs to restore constitutionally appropriate policymaking, prevent any repeat or amplification of the abuses of Mr. Trump’s first two years, and spare future presidents from temptation to repeat them. It only needs to remember how to exercise that power and pass a bill. Most of the necessary measures are already out there, introduced this year by incoming Ways and Means Committee Trade Subcommittee Chair Rep. Linda Sánchez and Finance Committee Chairman-to-be Ron Wyden. The three main aims should be to:
1. Require a formal vote of approval from Congress for any use of Sections 232, 301, and 201 of the trade code to impose tariffs. A president wishing to use these laws to impose tariffs could send Congress written notice of his or her proposed use of tariffs and their rationale, with a guaranteed vote on the plan within a limited time.
2. Require Congress to approve, likewise with a formal vote, any decision by a president to remove the United States from a trade agreement Congress has previously ratified, or to revise the tariff levels, rules of origin, or other substantive features of the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement, other free trade agreements, or U.S. WTO commitments and membership.
3. Repeal obviously antiquated or redundant laws that Trump has leveraged. For instance, Section 338 of the trade code, which Trump has wielded in his spat with Canada, was a never-used feature of the Depression-era Smoot-Hawley tariffs intended to address discrimination against U.S. goods that has been superseded by several subsequent statutes. The administration also at one point attempted to impose a temporary, 10% global tariff using Section 122, which was meant to deal with sudden financial crises, such as a dollar crash. Both are outdated and should be scrapped.
Use Tariff Policy to Make Things More Affordable, Not More Expensive
Second, Congress should turn the car around, using tariff policy to make things cost less instead of more.
Lawmakers should begin by canceling all of Trump’s second-term tariff decrees while deferring action on the older China tariffs until the next administration, enabling the next president to develop a larger Beijing strategy, including an appropriate place for trade issues. Should the Trump administration retain enough rump Republican support to block such a bill, repeal should be a first-day executive order for the next president.
Next, Congress needs to stop the bleeding in rural America. Trump has raised tariffs on farm inputs of all kinds, from simple tools and carpentry material to ultra-sophisticated agricultural machinery and irrigation equipment. His naive attempt to bring China to its knees in 2025 cost $20 billion in lost grain, oilseed, specialty crop, and meat exports — as he simultaneously launched mystifying fights with Canada and Mexico, the U.S.’s other two top farm customers, and then spiked fuel and fertilizer prices through the ill-judged conflict with Iran. As Congress surveys this dust bowl of farm policy, its immediate goal should be to stabilize the top markets — Canada, Mexico, and China — through a freeze on the USMCA “review” until the next administration and maintenance of a “truce” with China until the next president takes office and can develop a China strategy.
At the same time, Congress should review and begin reform of the permanent U.S. tariff system’s worst features. The Harmonized Tariff Schedule, though constitutionally appropriate, is archaic and full of regressive taxes dating to the 1920s and 1930s. Congress ought to oversee it as closely as it monitors estate taxes or excise taxes, but hasn’t done so since at least the 1950s.
A close look shows that U.S. consumer-goods tariffs are almost unique in the world in systematically taxing mass-market goods important to hourly-wage families — cheap sneakers, polyester shirts, stainless steel spoons — at rates well above those applied to exactly analogous patent leather, silk, and sterling silver luxuries. Equally startling, the HTS’s two clothing “Chapters” are bluntly sexist, extracting nearly $3 billion a year from women by taxing women’s clothes at rates 3 percentage points above men’s.
As with Constitutional authority over tariffs, an appropriate bill is already here: in the Pink Tariffs Study Act, Reps. Lizzie Fletcher (D-Texas) and Brittany Pettersen (D-Colo.) propose that the Treasury Department or U.S. International Trade Commission conduct a formal study of the tariff code for regressivity and gender bias, which Congress can use to streamline the tariff system and ensure that it does not impose an undue burden on hourly-wage families or discriminate against women.
Return to the World
The third task, though not one that will conclude before a new president takes office, is to design an affirmative agenda that should replace Mr. Trump’s tariff increases.
The details of such things are often very complicated and emerge from lengthy consultations within Congress, public debate, and interest-group policy development. The last “Trade Negotiating Authority” bill in 2015, for example, had 145 separate negotiating objectives, including reducing tariff rates, seasonal tomato policy, digital data flows, child labor, and much more. But these details come last. Any list of objectives rests on broader premises about American strengths, weaknesses, and responsibilities. If the premises are wrong, the specific goals will at least mostly be wrong too – and the premises of policy from 2017 forward have been wrong.
For almost a decade, an unwarranted gloom and defeatism have dominated U.S. trade policy. The two Trump terms shared with the Biden administration’s four years a sense that America’s 21st-century experience has mainly been one of suffering and decline, Americans aren’t able to compete with China’s state-driven manufacturing firms and shouldn’t try, and somewhere in the past — perhaps the 1970s for President Biden’s White House, the 1890s for Mr. Trump and his team — lies a golden age that full or partial withdrawal from the global economy could recover. This pessimism led both administrations to undervalue American strengths, brought the Biden team to abandon efforts to open markets to American goods and digital services, diminished the U.S. role in promoting global growth and development, and frayed America’s strategic relationships with neighbors and democratic allies even before Trump’s failed second term. The experience of the past two years has simply been much larger and its effects more obvious.
This month’s elections should signal a change of mood, and then a change of thinking. The public has chosen “affordability” over the “post-neoliberalism” of President Biden’s White House and the “populism” and “national conservatism” of Mr. Trump’s era, and re-engagement with the world over the Trump administration’s isolationism. Its choice is correct. Americans have much more to lose than to gain from “America First” isolationism, and much more to gain than to lose from engagement with the world economy. And America is a country with weaknesses to remedy, but many more strengths to build on. We remain a large manufacturer, a scientific powerhouse, and the world’s leading producer of countless crops. American businesses operate two-thirds of the world’s satellites, run the world’s information economy, and design its new medicines; American artists and creators write the world’s musical scores and produce its films.
A new approach should aim to take advantage of these strengths once again. As Congress and others think it through, some Biden-era concepts remain very useful. The Treasury Department’s “friendshoring” push and the Commerce Department’s investigation of supply-chain chokepoints are two such examples. The Obama administration’s vision of deeper integration with European and Asia-Pacific allies and friendly developing countries likewise remains the right strategic insight in a world where Russia has embarked on aggressive war, and China is a manufacturing colossus with a stranglehold on core industrial inputs. Ideally paired with modernizing legislation that remedies weaknesses — a universal worker adjustment program to replace the long-lapsed Trade Adjustment Assistance, a farm bill that helps agriculture rebound from its Trump-era losses, a regulation program for emerging artificial intelligence — a new approach can take some ideas from these earlier frameworks, while adding new ideas to address a few big priorities.
Call it America’s return to the world. As it breaks with the Trump legacy, the next administration should revive not so much the precise policies of earlier generations, but the enlightened self-interest and sense of common good that all postwar U.S. presidents but Mr. Trump have used as the foundation for policy, and return to leadership in developing a world economy freer, fairer, and better for Americans and others.
The top priority would be to stabilize and rebuild relationships with America’s neighbors and democratic allies. Faced with the large challenge of responding to Chinese growth and competitiveness, we should be pooling strengths with friends to bolster the democracies’ competitiveness, develop common approaches to challenges such as Chinese control of critical mineral chokepoints, and generally negotiate from positions of strength and security.
We should also re-engage with developing countries, for instance by reviving the Generalized System of Preferences and rebuilding the trade facilitation, public health, agricultural development, child and forced labor elimination, and other trade assistance programs run by the U.S. Agency for International Development, the Labor Department’s International Bureau, and other agencies decimated or purged altogether by the “DOGE” fiasco.
And we should stabilize and support the rules-based global trade system that earlier presidents, ever since Franklin Roosevelt, viewed as a crucial support for global growth, economic stability, and the rule of law. The World Trade Organization typically gets more criticism or dismissal than enthusiasm these days. But its basic rules are widely observed and extremely important to the stability of American farmers’ exports, logistics firms’ efficiency, innovators’ and artists’ ability to profit from their research and creativity, and manufacturers’ costs and regulatory confidence. Here, with deep divisions among the big trading economies, very large objectives are probably premature — but Congress can define a modest set of useful goals and reforms, modeled on recent WTO successes such as the Trade Facilitation Agreement of 2013 and the Fisheries Subsidy Agreement of 2022.
As we seek to rebuild these ties, we should also capitalize on our role as a technology leader. We remain the center of digital innovation and home to the world’s top tech and AI firms, a unique strength that also gives us the responsibility to guide safe development of new technologies and services. The logical agenda includes keeping markets open to services trade and flows of data, developing consensus on fair ways to regulate firms and tax digital products that don’t single out American companies for unusual burdens, developing common ground on regulating artificial intelligence, and finding common approaches to such shared challenges as child safety, cyber-security, and disinformation.
The November election marks the end of an error. Two years ago, Mr. Trump and his administration pledged to use tariffs to return America to the 1890s. Their ideas got a fair try. After two years, America’s growth has slowed, its workers’ real wages have fallen, its industry has eroded, and its power and reputation have been diminished. As in the Book of Daniel, American voters have weighed this program and Mr. Trump in the balance, found them wanting, and asked the opposition for something new.
Congress can act swiftly on part of this judgment. Other elements require time and patience. Where the “number” of Belshazzar’s kingdom turned out to be just one day — he was out by morning — Mr. Trump still has two years. He may be able to block some reforms in this Congress, and a general replacement policy must wait for a wiser successor. But that should make the next two years a period of intellectual vitality and reformist consensus-building: one in which Congress restores the Constitutional balance Mr. Trump has damaged, closes down as many bad policies and imposes as many good ones as it can, and works with the emerging presidential campaigns as they look to a better future.





These are the kinds of ideas the United States desperately needs. Thank you. We reposted your article and your biography on our Substack.
https://johnshanahan.substack.com/p/the-end-of-an-error